Libertarians such as J.R. Lucas have abandoned traditional Christian doctrines because they cannot reconcile them with the freedom of the will. Traditional Christian thinkers such as Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot reconcile it with the dogmas of the Faith. In Free Will and the Christian Faith, W.S. Anglin demonstrates that free will and traditional Christianity are ineed compatible. He examines, and solves, puzzles about the relationships between free will and omnipotence, omniscience, and God's goodness, using the idea of (...) free will to answer the question of why God allows evil, and presenting arguments that link free will to eternal life and to the nature of revelation. Topics covered include the meaning of life, the soul and Lesbegue measure, and strategies for discerning the voice of God. (shrink)

by W. S. F. Pickering Durkheim's sociological approach to morals and moral systems has always aroused considerable interest, be it by way of criticism or ...

This chapter contains section titled: Intervention and Human Rights.

A fundamental philosophical question that arises in connection with evolutionary theory is whether the fittest patterns of behavior are always the most rational. Are fitness and rationality fully compatible? When behavioral rationality is characterized formally as in classical decision theory, the question becomes mathematically meaningful and can be explored systematically by investigating whether the optimally fit behavior predicted by evolutionary process models is decision-theoretically coherent. Upon investigation, it appears that in nontrivial evolutionary models the expected behavior is not always in (...) accord with the norms of the standard theory of decision as ordinarily applied. Many classically irrational acts, e.g. betting on the occurrence of one event in the knowledge that the probabilities favor another, can under certain circumstances constitute adaptive behavior.One interesting interpretation of this clash is that the criterion of rationality offered by classical decision theory is simply incorrect (or at least incomplete) as it stands, and that evolutionary theory should be called upon to provide a more generally applicable theory of rationality. Such a program, should it prove feasible, would amount to the logical reduction of the theory of rational choice to evolutionary theory. (shrink)

By arguing that his use of representations at the core of Durkheim's sociological thought, this book makes a unique contribution to Durkheimian studies which have recently been dominated by postivist and functionalist interpretaions, and reveals a thinker very much in tune with contemporary developments in philosophy, linguistics and sociology.

'Thick neural event' is introduced to mean an event that requires firings of more than one neuron and a substantive (i.e. additional to merely temporal and spatial) relation among them. It is shown that some well regarded theories (e.g. by Lamme, Koch, etc.) strongly suggest that neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) are thick neural events. It is then shown that thin (= not thick) neural events provide sufficient causation for neural events leading to behaviour, and that there are good reasons (...) to reject overdetermination by thick events. Thus, any physicalism that recognizes legitimacy of a search for NCCs must either reject theories that embrace thickness of NCCs, or accept the epiphenomenalistic view that the properties in virtue of which we are conscious are not properties in virtue of which events causally contribute to our behaviour. (shrink)

The most recent edition of these books is that of R. M. Ogilvie , which should be read in conjunction with his Commentary on these books . The other modern edition to which I have referred is that of W. Weissenborn and H. J. Müller = W.-M.

By far the best edition is that of L. D. Reynolds . Other modern editions referred to are those of W. C. Summers ; R. M. Gummere ; F. Préchac et H. Noblot.

Take a hypothetical sequence of human beings ordered by height from tallest to shortest. Make sure there is no more than a difference of a millimeter between each person and make sure the tallest person is clearly tall and the shortest person is clearly not tall. Now consider the following argument: P1 A person of height n is tall ; P2 For any height n, if n is tall, then n–1mm is tall ; C Therefore, a person of height n (...) = 1mm is tall. P1 and P2 are intuitively true, C is intuitively false, yet the argument is deductively valid (the conclusion follows... (shrink)